

**TOP SECRET**

DOCUMENT NO. 34  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 16  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S O  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HK 19-2  
DATE: 5 JUN 1980  
REVIEWER:                     

*Eal*  
10 December 1959

Copy No. C 00

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800340001-1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800340001-1

25X1

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

10 December 1959

## DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK USSR-China: Sharply divergent press and radio treatment by Moscow and Peiping of the President's trip reflects the frictions and policy differences between the two regimes. Moscow is giving the President's activities reasonably factual and favorable news coverage. Peiping, on the other hand, is taking an openly hostile attitude, bitterly attacking the trip as an effort to "sell a false peace." The Chinese charge that "Eisenhower is merely using peace as a ruse in an effort to gain time to expand his own military strength in order to push aggression and war policy."

25X1

ND Communist China - Taiwan: Peiping will exploit its release from prison on 4 December of 33 "war criminals"-- including 30 former Chinese Nationalist officials--to suggest to Kuomintang officials that Peiping will be "lenient" with "compatriots" who defect to the Communist cause. On 5 December, Peiping beamed a special broadcast to Taiwan directing the attention of Nationalist military and government officials to the release of the prisoners.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

25X1  
25X1  
Japan: A crisis is possible within a few days in the Japanese Diet when the government moves to extend the current Diet session to ensure ratification of the South Vietnam reparations agreement. Leftists have made the agreement a major parliamentary issue, complaining that it ignores Hanoi's claims.

(Page 3)

NO  
25X1  
25X1  
Watch Committee Conclusions: Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist in Southeast Asia and particularly in the Middle East. In Iraq, Qasim is apparently again favoring the Communists; this may in turn spur anti-Communists to further attempts to overthrow his regime. Although many elements of continuing danger exist in Laos, the situation there appears relatively quiet for the time being.

10 Dec 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

OK  
Belgian Congo: The beginning of local elections in the Congo has been followed by renewed tribal violence in the interior. A state of emergency was declared in the Luluaburg area following tribal clashes which resulted in the death of about 15 natives on 7 December. Deep-seated animosity between two tribes may have been intensified by the failure of one tribe to join in boycotting the elections. Negotiations between Belgian authorities and African nationalist leaders designed to end the boycott have thus far been fruitless, and Belgian authorities fear further violence during the election period, which runs through 27 December. [redacted] (Page 5) (Map)

10 Dec 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800340001-1

Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800340001-1

25X1

Peiping's release from prison of 30 Kuomintang "war criminals"--announced on 4 December--is another step in the regime's long-term effort to convince Chinese Nationalist officials that Peiping will be "lenient" with "compatriots" who choose to defect to the Communist cause. On 5 December--one day after the release of the ex-Nationalists--Peiping beamed a special broadcast to Taiwan directing the attention of Kuomintang military and government officials to the release of the prisoners. An earlier broadcast had reiterated Premier Chou En-lai's offer for cooperation in the unification of the fatherland and had invited "patriotic" Chinese on Taiwan to "return to the mainland and see the situation for yourselves."

25X1  
25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] some American prisoners may be released as part of the current amnesty. Peiping considers the five Americans being held in Chinese prisons useful as political hostages, however, and their release would seem to be almost entirely dependent upon some improvement in Sino-American relations.) [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Parliamentary Crisis Threatens in Japan

An anticipated Socialist move to block, possibly by force, a government motion to extend the current extraordinary session of the Japanese Diet may result in a parliamentary crisis within a few days. A similar motion in November 1958, intended to permit passage of a bill to strengthen police powers, led to an outbreak of violence on the Diet floor.

The proposed extension would enable the government to overcome Socialist efforts to prevent ratification of the reparations agreement with South Vietnam, Japan's last major reparations program. The regular Diet session, scheduled to begin on 29 December, could then expedite the government budget for the fiscal year beginning in April and speed ratification of the newly revised US-Japanese Security Treaty.

The Socialists have been unable to arouse popular feeling against the reparations agreement, which they claim ignores French control of Indochina in World War II as well as possible complications with North Vietnam. Their position is considerably weaker than a year ago, because of election losses, a party split, and public indignation over excesses in recent leftist demonstrations at the Diet. Nevertheless, the Socialists are expected to introduce a motion in the Diet against the security treaty to coincide with a renewal of leftist demonstrations on 10 December. In their frustration, they could again resort to extreme measures in the Diet.

The ruling Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) is offering the Socialists a compromise--elimination of an LDP motion banning demonstrations in the vicinity of the Diet in exchange for Socialist permission to allow the reparations agreement to come to a vote without an extended session. Indications are that the Socialists will not accept the compromise offer. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]


25X1



25X1

Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800340001-1

Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800340001-1



25X1

Election Issue Stimulates Tribal Violence in Belgian Congo

The beginning of local elections in the Congo has been followed by renewed violence between Baluba and Lulua tribesmen in the interior. A state of emergency has been declared in the Luluaburg area following clashes on 7 December which resulted in about 15 deaths. An outbreak between the same tribes resulted in over 40 deaths in mid-October.

While animosity between the two tribes is deep-seated, the recent violence appears to have been prompted in part by controversy over the local elections, which are viewed by Brussels as a first step leading toward Congolese independence in about four years. [The Lulus are identified with political groups which oppose the holding of the elections and which are boycotting them on the grounds that Brussels has failed to provide adequate assurances concerning the Congo's political evolution. The elections are scheduled to run through most of December, and Congo authorities fear further violence.]

25X1

Negotiations in Brussels between Belgian officials and leading Congolese nationalists, aimed at ending the boycott, have broken down, and nationalist representatives are expected shortly to return to Leopoldville. Some Belgian officials, however, still hope that an accommodation will be reached with the Congolese leaders. The Socialists, who have withheld support of the government's Congo policy, have supported Congolese demands for a round-table conference, and pressure from them could result in some concessions to the nationalists.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800340001-1

# **THE PRESIDENT**

## **The Vice President**

### **Executive Offices of the White House**

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs  
 Scientific Adviser to the President  
 Director of the Budget  
 Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization  
 Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
 Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination  
 Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities  
 Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy  
 Executive Secretary, National Security Council

## **The Treasury Department**

The Secretary of the Treasury

## **The Department of State**

The Secretary of State  
 The Under Secretary of State  
 The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs  
 The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
 The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration  
 The Counselor  
 Director, International Cooperation Administration  
 The Director of Intelligence and Research

## **The Department of Defense**

The Secretary of Defense  
 The Deputy Secretary of Defense  
 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
 The Secretary of the Army  
 The Secretary of the Navy  
 The Secretary of the Air Force  
 The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
 Commandant, United States Marine Corps  
 The Director, The Joint Staff  
 Chief of Staff, United States Army  
 Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy  
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force  
 Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations  
 Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff  
 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army  
 Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force  
 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe  
 Commander in Chief, Pacific

## **The Department of Commerce**

The Secretary of Commerce

## **Federal Bureau of Investigation**

The Director

## **Atomic Energy Commission**

The Chairman

## **National Security Agency**

The Director

## **National Indications Center**

The Director

Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800340001-1

Approved For Release 2008/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800340001-1

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2008/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800340001-1

**TOP SECRET**